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Firms with Chinese Characteristics: 
The Role of Companies 
in Chinese Foreign Policy
Jie (Cherry) Yu
In recent years, Western media and governments have portrayed Chinese companies as soldiers in an economic Trojan horse, quietly buying up the world in an attempt to 
challenge the prevailing order. Indeed, in 2006, the Chinese government had launched 
a national campaign to encourage Chinese fi rms to ‘Go Global’, part of a strategy to 
increase China’s competitiveness and help rebalance China’s export-oriented growth model, 
as well as gaining political capital overseas. Chinese companies have acquired natural 
resources and purchased sophisticated technologies from their business partners and 
competitors. Meanwhile, the scope of Chinese foreign policy has expanded enormously, 
with its economic aspects given equal weight to Beijing’s security concerns. As a result, 
Chinese fi rms have become an indispensable part of China’s foreign policy making process. 
However, whilst Chinese companies are clearly one vehicle of China’s great power ambitions, its fi rms’ 
overseas activities deserve more nuanced analysis. Chinese fi rms play a crucial role in China’s geo-
economic strategy, but despite their sheer size, Chinese companies are short of global business exposure. 
Moreover, their very close relationship with the Chinese government has constrained their ability to 
become infl uential players in world economic affairs.
A TYPOLOGY OF CHINESE FIRMS
The Chinese fi rms analysed in this article are divided into three categories: the China International 
Investment Corps (CIC); the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); and large privately-owned companies. The 
most distinctive characteristic of all three types of companies are their close associations with the Chinese 
government, either in terms of funding or in terms of the strategic direction of their business activities.
The China International Investment Corps
The China International Investment Corps is China’s own sovereign wealth fund (SWF).  The CIC was 
set up in 2007 by the Chinese government as an investment institution tasked with generating higher 
returns on China’s $3,200 billion of foreign reserves than those offered by the US Treasury. The CIC’s 
formidable size, with a $200 billion seed fund and later $400 billion under its management, has attracted 
unprecedented attention around the world, and helped stimulate debate about the international role 
of SWFs more generally. 
33
The CIC has been particularly active in Europe and 
Africa, to the extent that it has become a representative 
of the Chinese government in conducting its 
economic statecraft. Around the world, SWFs are 
paying particular attentions to the type of industry 
they want to invest in, and measure their returns on 
investments over three to fi ve years cycle. CIC has 
concentrated on industries such as civil aviation, civil 
nuclear technology, bio-tech, infrastructure and oil 
and gas. In fi nancial year 2009-2010, the average 
Return on Investment (ROI) for CIC’s portfolios was 
around 11 percent, with a focus on high-technology 
portfolios in Europe and energy portfolios in Africa. In 
2011, CIC seized opportunities to invest in European 
infrastructure portfolios, mostly via the easier route 
of equity purchases rather than directly managing 
the targeted companies. This is because directly 
management requires related industrial expertise, 
which the CIC often lacks. Moreover, investing in 
infrastructure programmes provides local employment 
opportunities, which CIC hopes will help mollify 
any hostility to its investments within the countries 
involved, as for example in the case of CIC’s 8.6 
percent equity purchase of Thames Water in January 
2012. CIC has been particularly active in the UK since 
its market is more open to foreign investment than 
comparable economies on the continent. 
The CIC’s activities in Europe are mostly based on 
commercial merit, and focused like any other private 
investors on profi t maximisation and risk avoidance. 
However, its opaque management structure and its 
direct links with the State Council have caused great 
discomfort and at times outright hostility in hosting 
countries. The head of the CIC, Lou Jiwei, and most 
of its senior management, are directly appointed 
and assessed by the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Department of Organisation, and its investments 
are the subject of signifi cant public political scrutiny. 
For example, the CIC’s very fi rst investment, in 
Blackstone Corporation, a US private equity fi rm, 
made a huge paper loss and was much criticized 
domestically, resulting in the State Council ordering 
CIC to withdraw from the investment, turning a ‘paper 
loss’ into a ‘real loss’ of $1.9 billion. The head of the 
CIC was subsequently asked by the CCP Department 
of Organisation to explain the reasons for the loss 
during his annual performance assessment meeting. 
Thus the CIC’s close ties with both the government 
and the Party have distorted its portfolio management 
and may undermine CIC’s foundational goal of better 
utilising China’s foreign reserves.
The State Owned Enterprises
The second category of the Chinese fi rms is the 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which are mainly 
located in the energy, utilities, telecommunications, 
chemical, transportation and construction sectors. 
The fi rms constitute the main corporate tax-payers 
in China, and their activities and performance are 
supervised by the PRC State Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is 
currently responsible for 125 large SOEs. Like the CIC, 
the Chairmen of large SOEs are appointed and assessed 
by the CCP Department of Organisation. They are also 
party secretaries of their respective companies, and 
their overall management performance is evaluated 
by SASAC and Department of Organisation. Most 
subsidiaries of large SOEs are publicly listed, on 
either or both of the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock 
exchanges depending on different types of stocks. 
Unlike Western multinational companies, their non-
state shareholders play little role in determining their 
corporate strategies and overseas investments plans. 
Instead, their party secretaries usually possess fi nal 
decision-making power to initiate corporate strategies. 
Given their direct ties to the government, it is diffi cult 
to judge whether SOEs’ overseas investments plans 
are political decisions or based purely on commercial 
merit. Their close links with the state has become a 
double-edged sword for Chinese SOEs, providing 
support for overseas expansion but also hindering 
growth and profi t-making in foreign markets, where 
their direct links with Beijing have often provoked 
suspicions and hostility. 
Large Privately Owned Companies
The fi nal category of Chinese fi rms is the large 
privately owned companies. Many of these are the 
most well-known Chinese companies worldwide, 
including brands such as Huawei, Lenovo and 
Geely. Unlike the SOEs, they are private companies 
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with powerful individual shareholders who 
decide corporate strategies. They are independently 
run but are supervised by Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), and despite their operational 
independence, some of their senior management 
previously served in governmental institutions or 
the PLA. Doubts about the authenticity of their 
independence was emphasised by the deep suspicions 
in Western media (and among their potential clients) 
that marked a series of large scale overseas acquisitions 
were advertised yet necessarily supported by Beijing, 
which were seen as successes of Chinese companies 
‘Going Global’. This has hindered their business 
operations overseas, especially in in OECD countries. 
‘GOING GLOBAL’
China’s foreign economic policies have largely been 
directed to serve domestic economic and developmental 
interests. As Chinese growth has developed, those 
interests have become focused around the need for 
internal and external rebalancing of the economy. 
Over the past decade, the Chinese economy has been 
stimulated largely by ever-growing volumes of exports 
and major infrastructure investments. However, given 
the persistence of fi nancial and sovereign debt crises, 
Beijing has acted on the realisation that relying upon 
the export of low value-added manufactured goods 
cannot ensure the sustainable growth of the Chinese 
economy. Similarly, simply building more infrastructure 
is likely to aggravate overcapacity in the absence of 
signifi cant sectoral reform. The Chinese economy 
therefore requires restructuring both in an immediate 
timeframe and over the longer term. 
At the immediate level, foreign consumer demand 
for manufactured goods has fallen drastically in the 
aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial crisis, whereas labour 
and raw materials costs have risen disproportionally 
high, allowing lower-wage countries such as Vietnam 
and Cambodia to present substantial challenges 
to Chinese manufacturing. Over the longer term, 
expanding production scales and volumes are no 
longer suffi cient to fuel growth. Instead, Chinese 
firms need to move up the value chain of the 
global manufacturing sector. Currently, for a typical 
manufactured product, less than 20 percent of the fi rst 
profi t margin is captured by its Chinese manufacturer, 
with the remained shared by the product designers 
and downstream distribution, marketing and end-
customer support. ‘Going global’ aims to equip 
Chinese fi rms to compete with foreign competitors 
for this remaining 80 percent. The short-cut employed 
has been to utilise China’s large amount of foreign 
reserves and companies’ cash to acquire fi nancially 
distressed companies in developed countries, which are 
already equipped with the industrial and commercial 
brilliance that requires to make breakthrough. 
Alongside this economic adventurism in the developed 
world, soaring energy demand has led Chinese fi rms 
to explore opportunities in resource-rich but politically 
unstable areas, particularly for new sources of oil and 
gas, as documented elsewhere in this report. 
A further rationale behind the strategy of ‘going global’ 
is to ease political pressure on renminbi exchange rates 
with the rest of the world. Currently, foreign currency 
earned by Chinese exporters must be exchanged for 
renminbi once it arrives back on China’s shores. This 
fi xed mechanism requires that the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) holds an enormous amount of foreign 
reserves in order to manage renminbi transactions, 
and keep exchange rates at a level that provides a 
hedge against the volatility of global currency markets. 
Reducing China’s reliance on exports and investing 
abroad will alleviate the political pressure on Beijing 
when it crafts its foreign policies. The more foreign 
companies the Chinese acquired, the closer economic 
links with investment destinations will induce. This in 
turn will reduce the economic and political pressure 
to allow renminbi to rise. As a result, the renminbi 
exchange rates will be less likely to be a priority of 
China’s relations with other economies.
Indeed, Chinese fi rms ‘Going Global’ may be considered 
a better alternative than holding governmental bonds. 
This has been particularly the case during the eurozone 
crisis. China faces a dilemma of whether to follow its 
economic interests as the EU’s largest trading partner 
and increase its holdings of euro-denominated bonds, 
with the consequent risks that increasing its holdings 
will only further trap Beijing in this troublesome 
monetary union. On the other hand, reducing 
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Chinese exposure by reducing its holdings will certainly 
alienate political allies and more importantly threaten 
vital sources of imports of advanced technologies. 
The alternative is to encourage companies investing 
in the EU, particularly in areas such as aviation and 
civil nuclear sectors which would not have been open 
to foreign investors before the crisis.
For Chinese fi rms, ‘Going Global’ will ultimately 
increase their exposure to mature market economies, 
allowing them to learn sophisticated management 
skills and to create long-lasting brand value for their 
products. These intangible assets are abundant in 
developed countries but relatively scarce in China, 
and their development by Chinese fi rms will boost 
sales volumes and profi ts. Moreover, those companies 
that invest themselves of the opportunities of global 
expansion will reap the benefits in competitive 
advantage over other Chinese fi rms both in the 
domestic market and abroad.
THE LIMITS OF ‘GOING GLOBAL’
Chinese fi rms are determined to become some of the 
most important players in world economic affairs. 
However, their close association and somewhat 
submissive relationship with the Chinese government 
have impeded their overseas business plans. Moreover, 
Chinese fi rms often lack the requisite management 
skills to operate successfully in their investment 
destinations. 
The policy of Chinese fi rms ‘Going Global’ has been 
eagerly supported by national and local governments, 
as well as by policy banks, such as China National 
Development Bank and China Exim Bank. However, 
their close links with the government posed 
fundamental challenges to their overseas investments 
plans and existing business operations. All three 
types of Chinese fi rms need to gain approval from 
corresponding governmental institutions in order to 
carry out investment plans. Offi cial documents from 
the PRC Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) require 
that ‘all outbound investment plans must be submitted 
to MOFCOM for approval’, centrally if the investment 
volume exceeds $100 billion, and at the provincial level 
for smaller investments. In addition to MOFCOM’s 
approval, investors must consider the interests 
of other governmental departments, such as the 
National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), SASAC, PBOC and China’s Banking Regulation 
Commission. Even if a project is approved, the 
involvement of various government bodies with 
divergent attitudes towards overseas projects can 
cause delays, and any of the key governmental bodies 
I mentioned above can veto particular projects that 
they regard as unviable or which pose threats to their 
departmental interests. 
The intricacies of the approval process are not the only 
domestic constraint Chinese fi rms have faced. There 
is considerable evidence that Chinese fi rms have on 
occasion made clearly loss-making investments at 
the behest of government, which uses the deals as 
instruments to develop Beijing’s bilateral relations with 
other countries. Moreover, the government does not 
take responsibility for fi rms’ fi nancial losses that result 
from signing such investment deals. 
Alongside the hurdles of initiating overseas investments, 
Chinese fi rms have also encountered diffi culties when 
high profi le investments run into trouble abroad, with 
fi rms suffering losses provoking a strong sense of 
public anger and nationalistic sentiment. SOEs that 
have failed to acquire foreign companies or made 
signifi cant fi nancial losses are treated as traitors, and 
their management have occasionally been forced 
to apologise to both the public and Party elites. For 
example, CNOOC’s high profi le, failed bid for Unocal, 
the seventh largest American oil and gas company, led 
to the company’s CEO cutting his annual salary and 
submitting a letter of self-criticism to the Department 
of Organisation and SASAC to apologise for his 
‘mistake’ and explain why he failed in the bid. Such 
interplay between high-level politics and overseas 
investment decision-making has done more harm 
than good for Chinese fi rms’ global expansion plans.
Yet despite the political diffi culties that Chinese fi rms 
face, the biggest obstacle to their ‘Going Global’ 
is that they are not equipped with the suffi cient 
management skills to take on complex and long-
term investments abroad. Many Chinese fi rms have 
enough cash to acquire foreign companies, but 
have lacked the confi dence and knowhow to deal 
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with the challenges involved. Such hurdles co-exist 
on both the production side of their operations and 
downstream distribution channels. Most of the senior 
management teams of large Chinese SOEs appointed 
by the Party are equipped with industrial expertise, 
but not the necessary management skills and general 
market knowledge. These SOEs are unfamiliar with 
the market environments of investing destinations and 
have little understanding of their end-customers in 
foreign countries. As a result, they hire leading global 
consulting fi rms and investment banks to develop their 
overseas expansion plans. Some Chinese companies 
believe that outsourcing professional services fi rms 
is equivalent to possessing sound overseas project-
management skills themselves. However, the strategies 
offered by management consultants need to be 
tailored to the Chinese fi rms’ own requirements, 
yet are often based on the assumption that these 
companies have established and transparent corporate 
governance frameworks. Chinese companies may also 
hire professional services fi rms on the basis of their 
reputations rather than their deep industrial knowhow. 
In part, this refl ects the fact that engaging such major 
multinationals shows that Chinese fi rms can afford 
to employ consultants and investment bankers for 
their overseas projects, and in so doing validates their 
balance sheets.
On the production side, some Chinese fi rms, in 
particular SOEs, are unaccustomed to operating in 
a mature market economy. Over the past decades, 
Chinese fi rms have operated a model based on large-
scale investments, an uncompetitive domestic market 
and low returns on investment (ROI). Their profi ts have 
at least in part been derived through government 
interventions and protection. Chinese fi rms that 
operate abroad do not have ‘the Umbrella’ of the 
state, often operating in mature market economies 
where government interventions are minimal. Firms 
sometimes naively assume that smooth bilateral 
political relations between China and their investing 
destination countries will automatically produce good 
business environments, and believe they can therefore 
conduct ‘business as usual’ in those countries as they 
would in China. 
This of course is far from the reality. Most Chinese fi rms 
have had diffi culties dealing with local labour unions in 
their investment destinations and with respect to the 
cultural differences of local employees. Independent 
organised labour is a relatively new concept in 
China. China’s All Labour Union is affi liated to the 
CCP, whereas unions in OECD countries are often 
formidable forces in salary and welfare negotiations 
with their employers. Chinese companies have believed 
that simply retaining local labour forces following 
an acquisition will be suffi cient to maintain good 
industrial relations, and are not accustomed to labour 
unions asking for salary increases or going on strike. 
Chinese fi rms’ lack of experience in negotiating 
with unions has had detrimental effects on their 
overall operations abroad. For example, Shanghai 
Automotives (SAIC) managers began cutting hundreds 
of Ssangyong workers in 2006, and their relations 
spiralled downward. Ssangyong employees went on 
strike for nearly two months. Workers barricaded 
themselves inside the factory and locked the managers 
out, with the result that SAIC was forced to withdraw 
its management from the Ssangyong plant.
On the downstream distribution side, Chinese fi rms 
also need to develop their understanding of local 
customs in order to succeed in their business abroad. 
What is seen as customary in China may be considered 
very strange on another continent. Thus understanding 
consumer behaviour has been a genuine diffi culty for 
Chinese fi rms, which may not easily be discovered after 
entering the new consumer territory. For example, 
one of the most famous Chinese automotive SOEs 
set a very aggressive annual sales target for the year 
in which it entered the European market, but it had 
not observed consumer habits well enough before 
establishing its sales channels. In China, car purchases 
are mostly made as one-off payments to dealers, 
whereas European customers habitually use fi nance to 
divide their payments and use local banks to transfer 
their funds to dealers. Having not understood this 
market dynamic, the SOE had not put in place deals 
to make fi nance options or loan services available with 
either a local bank or foreign branch of a Chinese 
Stated owned bank. As a result, their actual annual 
sales were 10 times less than what they had targeted.
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CONCLUSION
In the light of their increasing overseas activities, 
there is no doubt that Chinese fi rms play a signifi cant 
role in China’s foreign-economic policy. On the 
one hand, most Chinese fi rms benefi t from both 
monetary and political support from the government. 
They are encouraged to act aggressively across the 
world to acquire natural resources and cutting-edge 
technologies. On the other hand, as fi rms, their close 
links with the government have hindered their business 
plans, as they have made economic and political 
compromises both at home and abroad in order to 
fi t with Beijing’s priorities. 
Chinese companies are particularly vulnerable – not 
to mention complacent – when they operate abroad. 
Some Chinese fi rms simply assume that acquiring a 
foreign company represents success, and treat it as 
an end by itself. However, the really tough challenges 
they have faced arise from post-merger management 
and market entry, as fi rms struggle to adapt to new 
and unanticipated situations without the Chinese 
government’s interventions and protection. Chinese 
fi rms are relatively new players in initiating foreign 
direct investments in other countries, having previously 
been more accustomed to being recipients of Foreign 
Direct Investments. As investors, they still have had a 
long way to catch up. China’s competence in ‘buying 
up the world’ has been grossly over-estimated by 
the West. ■
